



Romberg v. Nichols, et al.,
48 F.3d 453, 95 D.A.R. 2465,
No. 93-56296 (Feb. 24, 1995).
Plaintiffs Awarded $1 Each in
Civil Rights Case Are Not Entitled
to Attorneys' Fees
In this case, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit considered whether
a court must award attorneys' fees to a
plaintiff in a civil rights case who received
a verdict in the amount of $1. Plaintiffs
Michael and Debra Romberg filed suit
under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 against sev-
eral Los Angeles Sheriff's deputies and
against the County of Los Angeles itself;
among other things, the Rombergs alleged
that the deputies violated their constitu-
tional rights by not obtaining a search
warrant before entering their home in re-
sponse to a call about a domestic distur-
bance in 1982. After trial, a jury found in
favor of the Rombergs, but awarded only
$1 to each of them. Asserting their status
as prevailing parties under 42 U.S.C. sec-
tion 1988, the Rombergs sought an award
of attorneys' fees in the amount of $45,000.
The U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California eventually issued an
attorneys' fee award of $29,137.50; the
defendants appealed.
Relying on the U.S. Supreme Court's
recent holding in Farrar v. Hobby, 113
S.Ct. 566 (1992), the Ninth Circuit ini-
tially noted that the Rombergs are indeed
"prevailing parties" in the suit, stating that
even a plaintiff who wins only nominal
damages is a prevailing party under sec-
tion 1988; however, the court noted that
status as a prevailing party does not nec-
essarily entitle the Rombergs to attorneys'
fees. Citing Farrar, the Ninth Circuit noted
that the most critical factor in determining
the reasonableness of a fee award is the
degree of success obtained. Based on Far-
rar, the Ninth Circuit held that the Rom-
bergs are a "perfect example" of plaintiffs
who should receive no attorneys' fees at
all; according to the court, the Rombergs
may have prevailed, but they did not suc-
ceed.
The Rombergs attempted to distinguish
their case from Farrar by claiming that,
although they initially sought $2 million
in punitive and compensatory damages
against each of eight Sheriff's deputies,
their attorneys' closing argument suggested
that an award in the amount of "one dol-
lar" might be appropriate. The court ac-
knowledged that the Rombergs' attorney
did in fact make such a statement to the
jury, but found that "such a strategy cannot
trump Farrar. . [a]n attorney cannot avoid
Farrar's mandate by waiting until the close
of trial and then, when he perceives that
his clients have little chance of success,
asking for only nominal damages to jus-
tify an attorneys' fee award."
Finally, the Ninth Circuit found that
the Rombergs failed to identify any non-
monetary successes resulting from their
litigation efforts. The court noted that it
would recognize that if a lawsuit 'achieves
other tangible results-such as sparking a
change in policy or establishing a finding
of fact with potential collateral estoppel
effects-such results will, in combination
with an enforceable judgment for a nomi-
nal sum, support an award of fees."' How-
ever, the court found such tangible results




Powers, et al., v. City of
Richmond,
10 Cal. 4th 85, 95 D.A.R. 5885,
No. S039547 (May 8, 1995).
Statute Making Extraordinary Writ
Exclusive Mode of Appellate
Review Does Not Violate State
Constitution's Appellate
Jurisdiction Provision
Actions seeking disclosure of docu-
ments under the Public Records Act (PRA)
(Government Code section 6250 et seq.)
may be brought and tried in superior court,
and thus are within that court's original
jurisdiction; pursuant to Government Code
section 6259(c), superior court decisions
in PRA cases are not appealable but in-
stead are "immediately reviewable by pe-
tition to the appellate court for the issu-
ance of an extraordinary writ." In this
proceeding, the California Supreme Court
considered whether section 6259(c) vio-
lates the state Constitution and, in partic-
ular, section 11 of article VI, which states
that, except when a judgment of death has
been pronounced, the "courts of appeal
have appellate jurisdiction when superior
courts have original jurisdiction...."
Plaintiffs commenced an action in su-
perior court under the PRA to compel the
City of Richmond to prepare and release a
computer-generated report containing
specific information; after hearing evi-
dence, the superior court ruled for the City.
Plaintiffs then sought review in the Court
of Appeal both by a petition for writ of
mandate and by direct appeal.
After soliciting and considering infor-
mal opposition concerning the merits of
plaintiffs' PRA request, the First District
Court of Appeal denied plaintiffs' writ
petition summarily. The City then moved
to dismiss plaintiffs' appeal as barred under
section 6259(c); the First District issued an
opinion granting the motion. In so doing, the
First District interpreted the "appellatejuris-
diction" provision of the state Constitution
as granting the courts of appeal power to
review final judgments and orders in all
proceedings (except death penalty cases) in
which superior courts exercise originalju-
risdiction, but also as not requiring any
particular form or mode of this appellate
review. Concluding that extraordinary writ
petitions and direct appeals are alternative
modes of appellate review, the First Dis-
trict held that the "appellate jurisdiction"
provision of the state Constitution does
not deprive the legislature of authority to
specify that appellate review of superior
court orders in PRA cases shall be by
means of petition for extraordinary writ
rather than by direct appeal.
On appeal, the California Supreme
Court affirmed. Among other things, the
court found that the legislature's purpose
in replacing review by direct appeal with
review by extraordinary writ was not to
disadvantage litigants seeking review of
PRA decisions or to constrict the power of
the courts of appeal to correct errors in
those decisions; rather, the court found
that "the legislative objective was to expe-
dite the process and thereby to make the
appellate remedy more effective."
However, the plaintiffs contended that
appellate review by extraordinary writ pe-
tition is inherently less effective than a
remedy by direct appeal because issuance
of the extraordinary writs is discretionary
whereas direct appeal guarantees a deci-
sion on the merits. According to the court,
this argument "betrays a serious misun-
derstanding of the discretionary character
of extraordinary writs." The court explained
that although appellate review by extraor-
dinary writ petition is said to be discretion-
ary, a court must exercise its discretion
"within reasonable bounds and for a proper
reason." According to the court, "when
writ review is the exclusive means of ap-
pellate review of a final order to judgment,
an appellate court may not deny an appar-
ently meritorious writ petition, timely pre-
sented in a formally and procedurally suf-
ficient manner, merely because, for exam-
ple, the petition presents no important issue
of law or because the court considers the
case less worthy of its attention than other
matters."




Board of Supervisors of the
County of Los Angeles, et al., v.
Superior Court, et al.,
32 Cal. App. 4th 1616,95 D.A.R.
3066, No. B085744 (Mar. 7, 1995).
Discovery of Extrinsic Evidence on
Legislators' Thought Process Is An
Impermissible Judicial Intrusion
In 1993, the Los Angeles County
Board of Supervisors decided to consoli-
date court-related services in the County
sheriff instead of in the marshal's office.
Government Code section 26639 requires
the Board of Supervisors to "take into
advisement the recommendation of the
judges" as to their preferred agency; by a
vote of 298-63, the judges had voted in
favor of the marshal providing bailiff ser-
vices to the courts. Following the super-
visors' decision, plaintiffs-including the
Municipal Court Judges' Association, Los
Angeles County-sued the Board, and
subsequently sought discovery concern-
ing whether the supervisors ignored, or
even considered, the vote of the Los An-
geles municipal and superior court judges.
The Second District Court of Appeal
characterized the judges' discovery re-
quest as "an attempt to inquire into the
supervisors' mental processes in reaching
their decision to select the sheriff's office
instead of the marshal's office," and con-
cluded that "[liegal precedent prohibits
such an inquiry into the supervisors' men-
tal processes." Among other things, the
Second District stated that the "vague na-
ture of legislators' thought processes and
motives corresponds to the lack of an ob-
jective standard by which a party might
establish, or a court might review, whether
Board members actually considered the
judges' recommendation. The statute sets
forth no criteria concerning the length of
time, degree of earnestness, or amount of
effort or energy necessary for Board mem-
bers to comply with the statutory require-
ment that they take the judges' recommen-
dation into advisement. Neither does this
court have any means to judge the com-
peting considerations considered by the
Board, why those considerations pre-
vailed over the judges' recommendation,








Rights v. State of California,
Nos. 379257 and 379450
(Mar. 30, 1995).
Judge Orders State to Stop
Siphoning Money from
Tobacco Tax
On March 30, Sacramento County Su-
perior Court Judge Roger Warren issued a
decision holding that the state illegally
diverted millions of dollars from anti-
smoking education and research programs
to pay for health care services. Warren
held that the diversion of the funds vio-
lated provisions of Proposition 99, passed
by the voters in 1988; Proposition 99 im-
posed a tax of $0.25 per pack on cigarettes
and required that about a nickel of it be
devoted to tobacco control programs. With
the approval of Governor Wilson, how-
ever, state legislators enacted AB 816
(Isenberg) (Chapter 195, Statutes of 1994),
which diverted $128 million from those
accounts to medical services. Warren noted
that Proposition 99 allows the legislature
to amend its provisions only by a four-
fifths majority of each house and only in
a manner consistent with the measure's
purposes; although AB 816 received the
requisite four-fifths vote, Warren found




The day after California voters ap-
proved Proposition 187-the so-called
"Save Our State" anti-illegal immigration
initiative [14:4 CRLR 28-291-in the No-
vember 1994 election, attorneys filed
eight separate legal challenges to the mea-
sure in state and federal courts; the plain-
tiffs in those actions include the California
League of United Latin American Citi-
zens, the Mexican American Legal De-
fense and Education Fund, and the Center
for Human Rights and Constitutional Law.
[15:1 CRLR 183] The following is a status
update on the challenges to the initiative:
- Federal Court. On January 18, U.S.
District Court Judge Mariana Pfaelzer is-
sued a preliminary injunction prohibiting
enforcement of the challenged provisions
of Proposition 187 until a trial determines
their constitutionality; Pfaelzer found that
most of the measure will probably be
found unconstitutional, and its enforce-
ment would cause many people to suffer
irreparable harm because they would go
without medical care, be kicked out of
public school, or fail to report crimes and
abuse to police. [15:1 CRLR 183] State
attorneys responded by filing motions to
have Pfaelzer abstain from or dismiss the
federal court challenge to the measure; on
March 13, Pfaelzer denied those motions
without comment, and set a trial date of
September 5. However, state attorneys
have appealed Pfaelzer's issuance of the
preliminary injunction to the U.S. Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals; at this writing,
the appellate court is expected to issue its
opinion on the appeal in July.
- State Court. In November 1994, San
Francisco Superior Court Judge Stuart
Pollak also blocked enforcement of cer-
tain aspects of Proposition 187; specific-
ally, Judge Pollak issued a temporary re-
straining order prohibiting enforcement of
the measure's requirement that undocu-
mented immigrants be kicked out of the
state's public schools, as well as public
colleges and universities. [15:1 CRLR
183] On January 26, Judge Pollak tenta-
tively scheduled the underlying trial on
the initiative's ban on public education for
illegal immigrants, for June. Further, on
February 8, Judge Pollak issued a prelim-
inary injunction blocking enforcement of
the measure's provisions regarding public
education.
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